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In this paper I will try to explain how the Spanish system of the territorial organisation of power (State of
Autonomies) has managed to be relatively successful, up to the present, in its objective of accommodating the
plurinational reality of the State, due to a singular constitutional combination of autonomy and asymmetry. At the
same time, I will attempt to show the limitations of this formula in achieving the stability necessary to satisfactorily
articulate the ‘nationalisms’ present in this scenario. To this end, I will first introduce some aspects of the debate
about federal asymmetry in Spain (I). Next, I will briefly explain diverse constitutional mechanisms of the State of
Autonomies which allow the combination of autonomy and asymmetry (II). Finally, I will expound some reflections
which help to understand the limitations of the Spanish system in accommodating plurinationality, and I will make
some proposals to overcome these limitations (III).
I. THE ASYMMETRY DEBATE IN SPAIN (*)
1. The factors which made the question of asymmetry explicit
The political-legal debate which has accompanied the development of the State of Autonomies has centred
on different questions, according to the circumstances and events of each moment: the historical claims raised during
the democratic transition (the “re-establishment” of the Generalitat [the Catalan autonomous government], the
“historical rights” of the Basque Country), the nominalist controversies in the writing of the constitution (“nation”,
“nationality”), the disquisitions over the “nature” of the  State (federal, quasi-federal,regional, unitary-federal), doubts
concerning access to autonomy (article 143 versus article 151), the disputes over the distribution of powers
(exclusivity, concurrence, bases), discussion related to the financial aspect (solidarity, fiscal co-responsibility), the
debate about federalism and self-determination, the culmination of the process leading towards autonomy (the
“closing” of the model).
Since 1992, one of the themes which continues to be the object of attention on the part of scholars is that
which refers to the uniformity/diversity of the Autonomous Communities or, expressed in other terms, that of the
“asymmetry” of the Spanish model1. In fact, it could be said that this question has never ceased to be present,
although it has not manifested itself in such an explicit form until now. If one reflects a little on the debates which
emerged in relation to many issues —the extension of the pre-autonomies and the so called “café para todos” (coffee
for everyone), the Andalusia referendum and the attempts of the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) Government
to reserve the system of article 151 for the historical nationalities, the first Autonomy Agreement of 1981 and the
Law for the Harmonisation of the Process towards Autonomy (LOAPA), the financial system, or the linguistic
question— one realises that the theme of asymmetry has been “latent” in all of them.
The way in which the theme has become “explicit” is not pure coincidence, but rather has been produced in
a context in which many factors intervene. First, what could be considered an ‘unleashing’ factor: the second
Autonomy Agreement of 28 February 1992 subscribed to by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Popular
Party (PP), and their translation into the Organic Law 9/92, of 23 December, through which the powers of several
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debate, not so much about the “widening” but about the “equalisation” of powers2.
Second, the political factor, which appears after the result of the 1993 general elections, and PSOE’s loss of
an absolute majority, which brought about the need for parliamentary support from the nationalist parties. The
decisive position assumed by the Catalan nationalist coalition —Convergència i Unió (CiU)— in Spanish politics
continues to provoke controversy (to which I will return later) about the participation of nationalist forces in the
governance of the State and, by extension, about the very structure of the State of Autonomies in itself3.
Third, the dynamics that were let loose after the Debate on the State of the Autonomies in September
1994, in the recently created General Commission of the Autonomous Communities of the Senate in which —for the
first time using official languages other than Castilian— the Presidents of the Autonomous Communities took part,
with the exception of the Basque Country. The effects in the media of the meeting, and the final decision to
undertake a constitutional reform of the Senate reopened new arguments about the composition and functioning of
this Chamber which put the question of the Autonomous Communities’ equality and the development of the Spanish
system firmly at the forefront4.
Fourth, the conflict created by the development of linguistic “normalisation” in Catalonia and, specifically,
the questioning of the linguistic policy of the Generalitat in the field of education. Immediately after the Supreme
Court raised a constitutional question against the Law of Linguistic Normalisation, a lively controversy was
provoked by a highly “sensitive” subject in which the defence of national identity and the equality of rights come
together. The crucial decision of the Constitutional Court (STC 337/1994, of 23 December), which was reached after
an intense internal debate, put an end to a long legal controversy and halted a political crisis which could have had
unpredictable consequences. The Ruling asserts the constitutional legitimacy of the Catalan Goverment’s model of
“integral bilingualism” which, preventing the separation of students for reasons of language, placed Catalan at the
“centre of gravity”. In this way a certain asymmetry in the regulation of the use of languages was consecrated, when
recognising that the Constitution permits different linguistic models (specifically, in education) for the Autonomous
Communities5.
Fifth, a factor from the theoretical field whose significance is not irrelevant. I refer to the noticeable return
in the literature to historical, political and sociological questions, abandoned for years because of a highly technical
abstract argument which has given way to solid theoretical constructions, but which has often forgotten the reality in
which these arguments should have been developed. Thus, the link between the Basque and Catalan problem and the
structure of the State is revived in order to say that “it was and is another problem (...), a problem of being or not
being” because “one is not dealing with how to better arrange the territorial power of the State but, in the end, to
form or not form part of that State”6. It is pointed out that the ultimate objective of the State of Autonomies “is the
creation of an organisation in accordance, for the first time in our recent history, with the existence of diverse nations
or nationalities which have repeatedly shown their desire for self-government and, therefore, their final goal is not the
solution to a technical problem, but essentially that of a long and complex political problem”7. The impact of the
presence of nationalist parties (Basque and Catalan) in the Spanish system is revalued8. It is accepted that the
principal problem of the State of Autonomies is not one of powers, because behind the claim for powers “there is the
demand for some ability to act considered necessary for the affirmation of the self-government and the development
of the personality as a people”9. It is noted that the unique characteristic of the Spanish model “lies in the
coexistence of nationalities with a very strong political personality with regions where the main goal is to reach an
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importance has been advocated by a significant part of the doctrine— are openly questioned; it is considered they are
not adequate for the assumptions, needs and political bases of the Spanish State11 and, in general, that they “involve
more difficulties in societies which integrate communities with different cultures and languages, defined
territorially”12. With all of this, perhaps it is assumed that the federalism of our time must not respond so much to
challenges of an economic and social nature (co-operative federalism) as to those which derive from the attempt to
conciliate political unity and ethno-cultural diversity, when this is the foundation of nationalist aspirations that are
more concerned with sovereignty than association13.
2. The connection between asymmetry and plurinationality
From what has been said so far, one can deduce that the question of asymmetry in the Spanish debate has
been connected with the plurinational character of Spain and with the claims of the Catalan, Basque and, even if
somewhat more weakly, Galician nationalism. This has been reflected in the literature which has examined the
question14, and in the debate which the political forces have maintained in recent years on the subject15. At the same
time, it is clear that this connection, as I will explain later, is also manifested in other countries in which plurinational
articulation is under discussion, as in the case of Canada and Belgium16. In the three cases, the debate about
constitutional asymmetry maintains a close relationship with national identities in conflict. To put it another way,
the asymmetry de facto which supposes the plurinational composition of the State has raised the possibility of an
asymmetry de jure, which implies the setting-up of “legal-formal differences between the units of a federation with
respect to their powers and obligations, the form of the central institutions, or the application of the federal laws and
programmes”17.
Actually, the debate about asymmetry is not new. From a political scientific prospect it was established in
the well-known paper of Charles Tarlton18, in which he speculated about the possibility that a federal system “may
be more or less federal throughout its parts” when these present differences in their social, political, economic or
cultural characteristics. From a legal-constitutional prospect, the question of asymmetry was examined earlier
-without using the expression— in the historical federations, where equality between the member States was the
object of discussion. Thus, in the Philadelphia Convention, the admission of new members on the basis of equality
was rejected19, although later the US Supreme Court established the principle of the equality of the States “in power,
dignity and authority”20. The question was dealt with in Germany, under the Imperial Constitution of 1871, where
the jus publicist dogmatic admitted the possibility of according individual rights (jura singularia) to certain States
(Bavaria, Prussia) in relation to the whole21. But in none of the former approaches was asymmetry directly related to
plurinationality. The novelty of the debate about asymmetry in Spain (or Canada) resides precisely in the
aforementioned connection between legal-political organisation and the national question, which places the
Constitution at the centre of the controversy.
On this point one must be precise. The debate about asymmetry in Canada has been, since the Révolution
tranquille22, a debate de constitutione ferenda given that it has dealt with the very reform of the Constitution (Lac
Meech and Charlottetown Agreements): it has not been a debate about constitutional law so much as “constitutional
politics” or, better still, of “mega-constitutional politics”23. On the other hand, in Spain the proposal to reform the
Constitution of 1978 has not been clearly expressed —at least until today—24 and, therefore, the debate has been de
constitutione data because the flexibility of the text permits its asymmetric development, as I will try to explain in
the next section.
6II. DECONSTITUTIONALISATION AND “PRINCIPIO DISPOSITIVO”
1. A preconstitutional and subconstitutional model
The Constitution of 1978 which was approved during the political transition had to face up to some of the
outstanding problems of Spanish constitutional history: the position of the Monarchy, the settlement of a
democratic system, the subjection of the Army to civil institutions, the relations between the Church and State and,
of course, the so-called “national question”. The latter, in contrast to the other issues, had not been resolved either
socially or politically by the end of the seventies and, therefore, had to be resolved constitutionally. In fact, the
writers of the Constitution had two purposes: first, to transform the old unitary and centralist State into a more
modern, efficient and decentralised one, in a moment of generalised crisis in the Nation-State in Europe; second, to
find an accommodation formula for the historical nationalities in a new constitutional order which might recognise
their differentiated identity, and guarantee their capacity for self-government25. The simultaneous attempt to achieve
objectives, which nevertheless require different approaches, explains the peculiarity of the solution adopted and
many of its virtues and defects.
The writers of the 1978 Constitution were conscious that the “key” constitutional question was
specifically the territorial organisation of the State, about which the parties maintained divergent positions, and the
distinct territories presented very diverse situations. Thus, the well-known “consensus” of political transition which
operated throughout the constituent process did not finally lead to the adoption of a concrete solution, that is, it did
not lead to the establishment of a determined State model (i.e. federal, regional). The Constitution was limited to the
establishment of principles and of some procedures in order to begin a process of territorial restructuring of power
which could lead to distinct political models. Therefore, the so-called “modelo autonómico” (the current system of
Spanish devolution) is not found in the Constitution because this would have “deconstitutionalised”, at least partly,
the territorial organisation of the State26. In reality, as I have sometimes maintained before27, we are dealing with a
pre-constitutional model, because the generalisation of the so-called “provisional” regions before the Constitution
conditioned both its writing and even its later development; and of a subconstitutional model, because the
Constitution does not create the State of Autonomies: it does not constitute the Autonomous Communities, nor
delimit their territory, nor yet establish their organisation, nor does it determine their powers. All these constitutional
decisions are deferred to at a later time28, the constitutional text limits itself to establishing procedures in which the
principal players are, on the one side, the local representatives who must manifest their desire for autonomy; and, on
the other side, the central institutions, specifically, the lower Chamber of the Spanish Parliament (Congreso de los
Diputados), which must develop the so-called “bloque de la constitucionalidad” (the Statutes of Autonomy and laws
which delimit powers), and the Constitutional Court, which —by virtue of its jurisprudence— has the role of
supreme interpreter of the constitutional text.
It is important to point out that the construction of the State of Autonomies is governed by the so-called
“principio dispositivo” also known as “principio de voluntariedad”, according to which the process of territorial
restructuring must not be directed from the centre, but by the will of the territories and their representatives, to
whom the Constitution offers distinct possibilities to accede to autonomy. This is the great singularity of our
Constitution, that in this point is directly inspired by the Constitution of the Second Republic (1931), and which has
no parallel in any other country. The present model is therefore the result of a process initiated with the Constitution
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Communities and the essential elements of the model were set up, was dominated by some clear political majorities
in the Congreso, formed by the two big state parties (PSOE and PP), which agreed upon the development of the
model in two political Agreements (1981 and 1992)29. The second (1993 to the present), sees a loss of the majority
on the part of the elected state party (first PSOE and then PP) and what we could call an “asymmetrical majority” is
formed through a pact between a state party and a Catalan nationalist coalition (CiU), plus the support of the
minorities of the Basque Country and the Canary Islands in the Congreso. As I pointed out at the beginning, it has
been this change in the correlation of forces which has contributed, together with the other factors mentioned, to the
intensification of the debate about asymmetry in the second phase of the construction of the State of Autonomies.
2. Autonomy and asymmetry
Thanks to the open character of the constitutional provisions and the maintenance of the “principio
dispositivo”, the Spanish model has been able to combine autonomy and asymmetry, with a certain degree of
flexibility, in an attempt to make the aforementioned proposals compatible to decentralising power territorially and
to the constitutional accommodation of plurinationality. Let us see how these two elements develop.
First, autonomy. I use this expression, and I connect it to that of decentralisation because the process of
autonomy follows the idea of “devolution” far more than it does that of “federation”30. As I mentioned at the
beginning, the question of the nature (federal, regional) of the new Spanish State was the object of debate among
constitutional scholars when the new fundamental law took effect, and will possibly be so again in the future. In my
opinion, the Spanish model in its current development does not respond to federal schemes in many aspects31, among
which I would like to point out the following:
a) The State of Autonomies is constituted on the basis of the “national sovereignty of the Spanish people”
(art. 1, Spanish Constitution) and not on a constitutional pact between sovereign peoples32. The Constitution
recognises that the “Spanish nation” is made up of “nationalities and regions” (art. 2, Spanish Constitution), which
have the right to “autonomy”, in other words, to convert themselves into Autonomous Communities.
b) Only the Spanish Nation and its representatives (the Spanish Parliament) can decide upon the reform of
the Constitution (arts. 167 and 168, Spanish Constitution).
c) The distribution of powers between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities is
effected in the “bloque de la constitucionalidad” (which includes numerous central laws), and therefore there is no
proper constitutional guarantee of autonomy.
d) Not all State power is submitted to a double order of government: the Autonomous Communities do not
have judicial power,  nor do they have the capacity to establish their own bill of rights.
e) The system of distribution of powers is based, above all, on a generalised concurrence of jurisdiction.
There is almost no sphere in which the Autonomous Communities can establish their own policies in an
unconditioned way; this seriously counteracts the idea of “political” autonomy.
f) The model has not sufficiently developed the mechanisms by which the Autonomous Communities can
participate in general institutions, in the legislative body (the Senate), in the executive body (intergovernmental
relations), or in European affairs.
Clearly, these are some aspects of the Spanish model which preclude its full characterisation as “federal”,
despite its being based on territorial autonomy.
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referred to above, presents a remarkable level of heterogeneity, at least potentially, as the Constitutional Court itself
has recognised33. In accordance with this principle, in the Statute of Autonomy of each Autonomous Community, its
character (nationality, region) is defined, its territory is delimited, and the organisation of its political institutions, the
status of its own language and the level of their powers are determined, within the framework of the Constitution.
This, on the other hand, contains particular provisions (a “special status”) designed for determined territories such
as, for example, the First Additional Provision, which speaks of the “historical rights” of the forales territories,
referring to the provinces of Navarre and the Basque Country. Therefore, the model allows distinct solutions for very
heterogeneous territories, that is, for different political demands. I am not going to get involved in a detailed study of
the asymmetries de jure which the current Spanish model contains34 and which are manifested above all in the
distinct power levels in the Autonomous Communities, their internal organisation, the regulation of languages or the
financial system, but which do not extend to other aspects such as representation in the Senate, the composition of
the Constitutional Court or constitutional reform which, as I have said, do not have a properly federal configuration.
It is important to point out that the State of Autonomies has developed from an initial “differentiating”
interpretation which provided for Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country (Second Transitory Provision, in
relation to art. 152, Spanish Constitution) a distinct status from the rest of the Autonomous Communities, to a
homogeneous interpretation —which ranges from the first Autonomy Agreement (1981) to the second Autonomy
Agreement (1992)— whose objective is to reduce the scope of the “principio dispositivo”. As has been mentioned,
the combination of a series of factors from that time (1992) clearly signal an attempt to return to an asymmetrical
interpretation, leading to a differentiated treatment of the historical nationalities.
After having considered the two principles, autonomy and asymmetry, one must reflect a little in order to
distinguish how far each one goes. The guarantee of political autonomy to the territorial entities is, in itself, a
mechanism which generates diversity: it implies the possibility that in different parts of the territory, different
governments adopt distinct decisions when or if faced with the same issues. For this reason, the functioning of the
institutions in federal systems needs to accept the lack of organisational uniformity and diversity in the exercise of
powers35. Thus, the State of California can decide to prohibit gambling in its territory, while the neighbouring State of
Nevada decides to permit it. From a normative point of view, it seems clear that a system where the majority of
issues are decided by the territorial entities will be potentially endowed with greater diversity given that the
territorial powers will be able to adopt different rules and policies concerning many questions. From this perspective,
autonomy is in itself a potential generator of diversity and, in fact, is often confused with asymmetry. On the other
hand, when all the Canadian Provinces are endowed with the power of withdrawing from determined constitutional
reforms (“opting out”) or federal plans (Canada Pension Plan), an asymmetry is established, if only virtually so,
given that special powers are not conceded to any of them36. At the same time, when the power to regulate the scope
of the official status of their respective languages is attributed to all the Autonomous Communities, an asymmetry is
not properly established. This is not even the case when all States are endowed with a wide capacity for self-
organisation. In such cases, the consequent heterogeneity is the result of the differentiated exercise, on the part of
some entities, of certain powers given to all in equal measure. In this way, it is shown that federalism has in its own
roots a strong capacity to reflect and accommodate the diversity manifested through religious, ethnic, ideological,
cultural or national factors which can acquire a political expression. In the case of the national minorities, territorial
autonomy is basically an instrument of legal guardianship, by offering to these minorities the opportunity to exercise
a political weight greater than that which they would otherwise be able to exercise in central institutions37.
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can be taken as much as to where the decisions can be taken; not so much to citizens who have more power as to
where they exercise it38. In other words, asymmetry means that the exercise of power is divided in a different way,
so that some questions which are decided at a central level, for the citizens of the majority, are decided at a regional
level for the citizens of the minority. The alteration of the division between central power and territorial power thus
responds to the variations in the perception of political identity, and this is its justification. The tendency of the
minorities towards a division of powers distinct from the majorities lies in their perception that this has a value; and
their preference is a result, specifically, of their autonomy as a political community. In short, constitutional
asymmetry does not equal autonomy, since it requires singular rules directed to creating a “special status” for certain
political units within a federal system.
Therefore, it can be affirmed that the Spanish model which has been established since the Constitution of
1978 is not really federal or asymmetrical, although it contains elements of both definitions. We are dealing with a
system which concedes ‘low’ autonomy to territorial entities (with the possibility of realising their own political
options but within the framework of the policies adopted by the central government) and a limited participation in
general institutions; and it is a system which establishes a potential heterogeneity, or better, which allows for an
asymmetrical development but which does not impose it. This singular combination of autonomy and asymmetry
has been relatively successful,  up to the present, in the achievement of the aforementioned objectives established in
the constituent process: decentralisation and plurinational accommodation. However, as I will try to explain next,
owing to its limitations in articulating the ‘nationalisms’ present the model has not achieved  a satisfactory degree of
stability.
III. FEDERALISM, NATIONALISM, PLURINATIONALITY
1. Territorial federalism versus multinational federalism
Federalism, as a criterion of social and political organisation, aims to organise co-existence through the
articulation of a plurality of systems in a common polity, capable of integrating the diversity of its parts39. But in
spite of the fact that federal unity, at root, “is a way for the composition of diversity”40, reality shows that it is not
always a sufficiently flexible framework with which to accommodate nations or nationalities —reclaiming a level of
autonomy appropriate to guarantee the protection and the development of their collective identity— in the same
political space. In fact, this is the case when the political bodies between which the same power is shared are
different in terms of one, or more, politically expressed factor, as happens with national minorities in a federal State,
in any of their variations. This is what happens in those societies which Herrero de Miñón has called “differential”
(non-federal), in other words, those in which there are communities of national character alongside other communities
which have no such character41, as is the case with Great Britain, Canada, Belgium or Spain. The constitutional
experience of the last couple of decades shows us the remarkable difficulties which have emerged when stable federal
structures have tried to be developed in such differential societies. What are the reasons for this difficulty? Professor
Rubio Llorente reminded us in a seminar of the dogma inscribed in almost all German handbooks, according to which
“federalism is incompatible with nationalism: there cannot be federalism in societies where distinct nationalities
exist”42. From another point of view, it has been pointed out that nationalism is a difficult ideology to integrate
within a federal or quasi-federal project, given that it is not only sustained in a legal formula but also in the aspiration
of loyalty to the common project43. On the other hand, Michael Keating has suggested that it is not possible to find a
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constitutional formula which can satisfy a nation that seeks an ambiguous position, one which would be, in part, in
the interior and, in part, on the exterior of the State44.
I am more convinced by the explanation according to which in the federal (or quasi-federal) formulas used in
“differential societies” two contradictory principles coexist: that of identity and that of public efficacy. In
accordance with the first, the constitution of autonomous entities responds to the need to protect the peculiarities of
communities endowed with a differentiated political identity. In accordance with the second, federal organisation is
justified by virtue of its greater effectiveness in undertaking public functions, and by bringing the centres of political
decision closer to the citizens45. In federal countries with national minorities, both principles are present and,
normally, there is the generation of logic which may be both contradictory and even incompatible46. On one side,
there is the logic of the national minorities, which reclaim a constitutional and political recognition for their
differentiated identity, and sufficient self-government for its maintenance and development; on the other side, the
logic of the national majorities, which see in federalism a factor of democratic reinforcement and a technique for
decentralisation. We can observe the tension between the two types of logic just mentioned in the countries referred
to above. In the case of Belgium, it can be seen in the divergence of political leanings in Flanders (cultural
communitarisation) and Wallonia (economic regionalisation)47. In the case of Canada, tension lies in the contrast
between the demands for greater autonomy on the part of Quebec and the need to reinforce the federal government
expressed by the other Provinces48. And in the case of Spain, we can observe the contrast between Basque and
Catalan nationalism and “what could be called the political thought of Ortega y Gasset, which would be translated
into modern egalitarian and federalist approaches”49. In these situations, the generalisation and equalisation of
autonomy is worked out under the logic of the first principle (efficiency), particularly difficult to match with the
logic of the second (identity), and which has repercussions on the very concept of autonomy, as Viver Pi Sunyer has
made clear50.
Actually, the contrast between these two types of logic emerges from the connection outlined above
between asymmetry and plurinationality, which has arisen in recent debates in Spain (and also in Canada). The terms
and positions maintained in these debates clearly demonstrate the important role that political identity acquires in the
discussion, in other words, the form in which citizens perceive their belonging to a community upon which political
institutions are constructed51. So, for instance, the distinct demands for self-government are based on different
justifications, which bring different conceptions of the equality of powers between “national” units and “regional”
units. For the first, to guarantee equal powers to the nations and to the regions means, in fact, the denial of equality
to the minority, reducing their status to that of a regional division of the nation. In contrast, for the latter, to concede
special powers to the minorities implies considering certain territorial units as less important than others and,
therefore, gives discriminatory treatment to their citizens52. In fact, as Kymlicka has pointed out53, the demand for a
particular status on the part of national minorities is not only directed to an increase of powers, but also to their
recognition as nation. These positions reflect a more profound difference in the very concept of federation: for the
minorities, federalism is above all a federation between founding peoples based on equality, which would demand
asymmetry between national and regional units; for the majorities, federalism is first and foremost a union of equal
units, which demands symmetry. On the other hand, the national minorities often conceive the structure of the
system more as a confederation than a federation54. Their basic claim does not consist in defending the political
community as culturally diverse, but in sustaining that more than one political community exists, each one of which
has the right to govern itself.
2. The limitations of the “modelo autonómico”
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The earlier considerations make it clear that the connection between asymmetry and plurinationality in
Spain poses political and legal problems of great scope, preventing the consolidation of the State of Autonomies and
of its endowment with a certain stability. Certainly, to any observer it is undeniable that since the political transition
there have been great and rapid advances: in 20 years, few States have experienced a process of political
decentralisation like that undergone by the Spanish State. At the same time, in the modern history of Spain, Catalonia
and the Basque Country have never had  recognition and self-government comparable to those achieved in the final
stage of this current century under the Constitution of 1978. However, the development of the “modelo
autonómico” has shown its limitations when it comes to achieving the main objective that is pursued by the
Constitution, i.e. the accommodation of the historical nationalities within a common constitutional space that might
guarantee their constitutional recognition and political autonomy. Such limitations, in my opinion, do not come so
much from the Constitution itself as much as from its development over these years. Certainly, the Constitution of
1978 in many ways fails to establish a federal State, as I explained earlier. But this does not seem to me to be its main
flaw because I believe that in Spain the conditions for a properly federal project do not exist: Spanish civil society is
not a federal society, nor has the federal culture penetrated the political and intellectual milieu, and such a project is
not a priority objective for the political forces in Spain. It is not a priority objective for the Spanish state-wide
political parties (PSOE and PP) because they see in it a threat to national unity; and it is not a priority objective for
the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties because they believe that they would not see their political demands
satisfied under such a system.
The limitations come, therefore, from the constitutional development which has taken form in the “modelo
autonómico”, which has misused the possibilities offered by the Constitution of 1978 to articulate the
plurinationality of Spain. First, it has eliminated the constitutional recognition of that plurinationality, blurring the
initial distinction between “nationalities” and “regions” (article 2, Spanish Constituiton), a provision aimed precisely
at recognising the difference of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia within the State of Autonomies. Second, it
has conferred on those communities a level of autonomy remarkably inferior to that which could have been obtained
with the same Constitution, a fact which has generated constant demands on the part of their autonomous
governments (Catalonia and the Basque Country), in the hands of the nationalist parties. This, in its turn, has
provoked (by emulation) the claim of the other Autonomous Communities, compelling the central government to
extend to all of them the same powers that it was initially devolving to the first. Third, the asymmetrical potential
which the “principio dispositivo” contained —seen unfavourably by the state-wide parties— has been reduced,
generating a growing dissatisfaction among nationalist forces, desirous of special status. Finally, instruments of
integration and participation in general institutions (the Senate, conferences) have not been developed, owing to an
incapacity to find mechanisms of political representation adequate for a “differential society” like that of Spain. This
deficit has been compensated for, since 1993, with the collaboration of nationalist forces with the Spanish
government, perhaps the “most relevant experience of Spanish political life in terms of unity/diversity”55 which,
however, has stirred up a confrontation between the two main state-wide parties and has brought a degree of
rejection on the part of some of the public at large. The main weakness of this mechanism of integration lies in the
fact that it is based on factors as volatile as electoral results and the capacity to reach agreements between the parties
represented in the Congreso. In short, these in my view are the reasons for which the State of Autonomies, despite
the success that it has had from many points of view, has not managed to establish itself as a system of plurinational
accommodation in Spain.
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Good evidence of this is that recent political events —from the Barcelona Declaration to the Basque
elections, through the ETA truce and the twentieth anniversary of the Constitution— have unleashed a stormy
political and media debate —about the State of Autonomies and the validity of the constitutional pact of 1978— in
which the link between asymmetry and plurinationality continues to be maintained. As in other countries, the recent
debate in Spain shows that the pressure for asymmetry from the minority ‘nationalisms’ is normally replied to by
pressures for symmetry on the part of the majority nationalism, and that this tension between opposing pressures
can become a significant characteristic of the system and of its political dynamic56. The success of the State of
Autonomies rests precisely on its flexibility to channel this dynamic, permitting a re/negotiation which may adapt
the constitutional compromise to successive political and economic changes and to changes in public opinion.
Therefore, I think that the current circumstances and the probable consolidation of certain tendencies within the
Spanish political system (hegemony of the nationalist forces in their respective territories, the lack of a clear majority
on the part of the ruling party in Spain, advances in the peace process in the Basque Country, the deepening of
European integration), demand a renewal of “constitutional consensus” which may commit the state-wide forces and
the nationalist forces to the design of a new model, thereby overcoming the limitations of the “modelo autonómico”.
3. Constitutional consensus and a new model
The attainment of this renewed consensus can only take place under certain conditions, it should affect
determined contents and would be possible to be carried out through concrete procedures.
The main conditions for a political consensus in the current circumstances would basically be those which
might contribute to ensuring a commitment between the nationalist minorities and the nationalist majority57. Through
this pact, the former would be obliged to clarify their political demands, articulating them in a constitutional project,
for the whole of the State, that was widely accepted by the citizens of these communities, and which could be
negotiated with all the parties; for its part, the latter should recognise without reservation the plurinationality of the
State, accept the necessary accommodation within the State of the historical nationalities, and guarantee their right to
make use of real political capacity for self-government. From my point of view, only through this commitment will
the negative inclinations of both parts be overcome: that of Spanish nationalism, seeing in peripheral nationalism a
danger which must be resisted and excluded from the construction of the State; and that of peripheral nationalism,
seeing an insuperable impediment to its aspirations in the State, outside of which is the only place to realise its future
plans. These inclinations are evident in the current debate and confirm the connection referred to above between
asymmetry and plurinationality, now in the form of adopting attitudes that are not only defensive but also
destructive: asymmetry is promoted or rejected from the position of denying national identity to the other party or
parties in question. In the face of the questioning of Spanish national identity on the part of the peripheral nationalist
parties, the majority nationalism denies the national character of Catalonia and the Basque Country, delegitimising
the argument of the nationalist forces, and proposes to end their decisive position in the governance of Spain58.
I believe that at the end of the twentieth century, phenomena such as economic globalisation, the emerging
of new technologies, the explosion of communications, multiculturalism or European integration lead to the
overcoming of the idea of Nation-State and, thus, demand a reopening of the strategies of nation building for all forms
of nationalism. As Gurutz Jáuregui has pointed out, “nationalism in general, and the European minority nationalities
in particular, need to adapt themselves to the new historic circumstances, to new realities, to the profound social,
economic, technological and cultural changes of today. This is the fundamental problem of nationalism at this
moment (...)”59. On the other hand, the vindication of cultural recognition which the postmodern State must face have
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made the limitations of modern constitutionalism clear, raising the need to rethink part of its principles in order to
better realise the values of liberal democracy60.
The new constitutional consensus should focus on those aspects of the present model which, as I have
mentioned, have demonstrated their limitations in achieving a stable accommodation of plurinationality. For this
reason, it would have to contain proposals in relation to the following matters. First, the recognition of Catalonia, the
Basque Country and Galicia as national communities within the Spanish State and the translation of this recognition
into legal, symbolic, political and institutional fields through specific measures to be developed over time61. Second,
the attributing of real political capacity of self-government to the Autonomous Communities as entities which fully
exercise a part of power, including judicial power. This would demand the transformation of the concept of
autonomy, as much quantitatively as qualitatively, in other words, it would require understanding autonomy as the
minority nationality’s capacity to develop its own policies unconditionally in issues that come within its
jurisdiction. Third, the setting-up of a system of financing for the Autonomous Communities which confers more
autonomy on them, and the financial sufficiency to exercise their powers, as well as bringing them more fiscal
accountability. That is, a system which does not articulate inter-territorial solidarity based on strict equality,
resulting in discriminatory treatment towards the Communities that create more wealth. Fourth, the opening of
mechanisms for the participation of the Autonomous Communities in the general institutions of the State at a
legislative (Senate), judicial (General Council of Judicial Power, Constitutional Court), financial (Tax Agency) and
executive level (Ministry of Intergovernmental Relations and not of Public Administrations, as is currently the case).
Fifth, the process of globalisation and transformation of international relations demands a certain capacity, on the
part of Autonomous Communities, to project themselves abroad, especially in the case of those communities which
have a differentiated national identity; on the other hand, the effects that the process of European integration produce
in the autonomy of the Autonomous Communities requires that these be able to contribute directly to the ascendant
and descendant phase of European policies affecting their powers. Finally, all these aspects are susceptible to being
developed asymmetrically in order to give space to heterogeneous political demands, in other words, articulating
diversity in diverse ways. This should come about by respecting two criteria: that the demands of the national
communities must not create obstacles to the demands —if and when they are made— of the other Autonomous
Communities; but neither can such demands be rejected simply on the grounds of having been claimed exclusively by
the national communities.
With regard to procedures, a consensus about the transformation of the current model into one which is
plurinational and asymmetrical would not necessarily require constitutional reform in order to carry out all the
changes mentioned. Given the singular features of the Spanish constitutional text, already pointed out, and the
possibilities that this offers to subconstitutionally develop another model62, the majority of the proposals could be
brought about by introducing or reforming statutory law which, together with the Constitution, integrate the “bloque
de la constitucionalidad”. Thus, the widening of powers could be achieved through the transfer of the powers of state
jurisdiction to the Autonomous Communities (art. 150.1 and 2 Spanish Constitution), the formal and material
revision of basic central legislation, or the revision of the Statutes of Autonomy. The same could be said of the
system of financing the Autonomous Communities, almost totally designed in the Law for the Financing of the
Autonomous Communities (LOFCA) and other central laws. This could also be the case for the participation of the
Autonomous Communities in the formation of the will of the Spanish State in the European Communities, partially
regulated in state legislation (Law 2/1997, of 13 March). In contrast, the modifications directed to facilitate the
participation of the Autonomous Communities in some of the general institutions of the State (Senate, Constitutional
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Court, General Council of Judicial Power) would require a constitutional  amendment, given that it is the very
Constitution which directly regulates its composition and functioning.
In any case, recent experience shows that the majority of political reforms do not presuppose an
insurmountable legal-constitutional problem. As Alejandro Nieto has observed, “the roots of evil are normally found
in politics and not in rules”63. And there is no doubt that the Spanish system of territorial organisation (symmetrical
or asymmetrical), simply because of its link with the national question, is essentially a political concern.
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(*) This work is a revised and extended version of the paper which under the title of “Asymmetry and
Autonomy in Spain” I presented in the name of the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) in the Annual
Meeting of the International Association of Centers for Federal Studies (IACFS), dedicated to the subject
“Federalism and Peace-Making”, which took place in the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs between 19 and 23
October 1998. Later, I had the opportunity to discuss it with my colleagues in the Department of
Constitutional Law at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and I appreciate the comments they made.
This article is framed within the research I have carried out since 1995 thanks to a grant from the Institut
d’Estudis Autonòmics of the Generalitat de Catalunya for the study of foreign autonomies (1995) and thanks to
a Canadian studies research grant from the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1995) which allowed me to
spend a period at the Université de Montréal (Canada), working with Professor José Woehrling. The majority of
my articles cited in the text are the result of this research, which I have pursued within the Project “Federalismo,
igualdad y diferencia” (DGICYT. PB96-0972), grant-aided by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Culture
(Programa Sectorial de Promoción General del Conocimiento) in 1998.
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